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Prior to the economic and financial crisis in 1997, the fiscal position of Thailand was in surplus for nine 
consecutive years. As a result, the public debt declined and bottomed at 14% of GDP in 1995/96. 
When the 1997 crisis occurred, the government absorbed substantial financial sector losses, coupled 
with conducting an expansionary fiscal policy. This resulted in a large increase in public debt to a peak 
at 58% of GDP in 2000/01. However, public debt gradually declined to 54% in December 2002 while 
the government cash deficit turned out better than planned in 2001/02 due to economic recovery and 
fiscal consolidation. 
As the public debt is one of the country’s medium-term risks, its increase over the past few years 
raises concerns over the country’s economic stability. This paper assesses the current fiscal status 
and the sustainability of the Thai public debt over the medium term. The next section provides an 
overview of Thailand’s public debt. Sections 3 and 4 address the public concerns over the costs of 
financial sector restructuring and also the government’s initiatives. The analysis of public debt 
sustainability is presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes. 
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Source: Public Debt Management Office (PDMO). 
                                                       
1  Senior economist in the Monetary Policy Group of Bank of Thailand. The author expresses her gratitude to Varapat 
Chensavasdijai for his review and editing of the public debt sustainability section. Special thanks are conveyed to Steven 
Barnett, Akkharaphol Chabchitrchaidol, Boonyawan Manvichachai, Vilada Meeyam, Bandid Nijathaworn, Pichit 
Phattaravimolporn, Atchana Waiquamdee and Prasong Werakarnjanapongs for their valuable comments. The views 
expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and not necessarily those of the Monetary Policy Group or the 
Bank of Thailand. 
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 2. Public  debt 
The public sector debt in Thailand consists of three components: government debt, non-financial 
public enterprise (NFPE) debt, and Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) debt.
2 
Table 1 shows public debt as of December 2002. Debt issued by the government amounted to 31% of 
GDP, including domestic and external borrowings to finance government expenditure and some of the 
financial restructuring costs (Tier 1, Tier 2,
3 and FIDF I and III). The NFPE debt, equivalent to 17% of 
GDP, comprises government-guaranteed and non-government-guaranteed debts, while the FIDF debt, 
amounting to 6% of GDP, consists of FIDF II and non-government-guaranteed liabilities. Thus, the 
level of public debt as of December 2002 was THB 2,931 billion or 54% of GDP. 
The current public debt data already include debt incurred by the NFPE. This inclusion somewhat 
overstates the resources required to service the debt, ie the fiscal burden. This is because state 
enterprise debt will be part of the fiscal burden if and only if a state enterprise defaults. But not all state 
enterprises are risky. Table 2 shows 10, out of 59, state enterprises bore operational losses for three 
consecutive years or had negative net worth, and their debt accounted for only THB 115 billion or 13% 
of total state enterprise debt. 
 
Table 1 
Structure of public debt 
In billions of baht; end-September 
    1996 1997 2000 2002  2002  (Dec) 
1  Government debt   176  238  1,114  1,671  1,690 
  % of GDP  4.3  5.0 22.8 30.9 31.3 
2  NFPE  debt  432 538 909 907 901 
  % of GDP  10.5  11.3 18.6 16.8 16.7 
3 FIDF  debt
1  0 893 781 357 340 
  % of GDP  0.0  18.7 15.9  6.6  6.3 
4  Public  debt  (1+2+3)  608 1,669 2,804 2,935 2,931 
  %  of  GDP  14.8 35.0 57.3 54.4 54.3 
  (Domestic : external)  (36 : 64)  (67 : 33)  (69 : 31)  (72 : 28)  (72 : 28) 
1  Since December 2002, the FIDF debt has consisted of the THB 112 billion of government-guaranteed bonds (FIDF II) and 
the non-guaranteed debt, which was THB 228 billion. 
Sources: Public Debt Management Office (PDMO); Bank of Thailand. 
 
Taking into consideration only debt incurred by loss-making state enterprises, the figure stood at 
THB 2.1 trillion (40% of GDP) compared with the public debt figure of THB 2.9 trillion (54% of GDP), 
which included the debts of all non-financial state enterprises. 
 
                                                       
2  A more detailed explanation of the cost of financial sector restructuring is given in Section 3. 
3  The government recapitalised the distressed financial institutions by issuing Tier 1 and Tier 2 bonds, for which, in return, it 
received preferred stocks and subordinated debentures, respectively. 
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 Table 2 
Non-financial public enterprises with net losses over three consecutive years 
In millions of baht 
Net loss  Financial statement 2001  Debt 
NFPE 
1999 2000 2001 Assets  Liabilities  Equity  Dec 
2002 
  1  State Railways of Thailand  4,153 4,685 3,824  66,020  43,306 22,714  47,585
  2  Bangkok Mass Transit Authority  2,689 2,889 3,721  4,418  21,590 –17,171 16,093
  3  Bangchak Petroleum   1,783  1,565 2,987  26,393  23,962 2,431  18,318
  4  National Housing Authority 116  452  877  50,103  47,188  2,915  21,037
  5  New Bangkok International Airport   94  147  57  17,980  3,571  14,409  11,222
  6  Dairy Farming Promotion Organisation 
of Thailand  175  220  117  998  900  98  409
  7  Zoological Park Organisation  12  30  42  1,459  8  1,450   
  8  Botanical Garden Organisation  31  37  34  539  6  534   
 9 Thai  Tanning  Organisation  18  11  90  361  416  56  50
  10  Express Transportation Organisation  
of Thailand  87 43  118  315  1,505  –1,189  53
Total            114,767
Sources: NESDB (2002); PDMO. 
 
3.  The cost of financial sector restructuring 
During the crisis, the FIDF
4 carried out quasi-fiscal activities such as providing full guarantees to the 
depositors and creditors of closed financial institutions, recapitalising a number of financial institutions, 
and bearing the additional cost of the non-performing assets of financial institutions transferred to the 
Thai Assets Management Corporation.
5 BOT (2002) estimated the FIDF’s losses at THB 1.4 trillion. 
A part of FIDF’s losses has already been covered by the issuance of THB 500 billion worth of 
government bonds in 1998. In 2000, the FIDF issued FIDF bonds worth THB 112 billion with a 
government guarantee to compensate the losses. In 2002 the government passed an emergency 
decree to empower the Ministry of Finance to issue up to THB 780 billion of bonds (FIDF III) to cover 
the estimated non-guaranteed FIDF losses. Consequently, THB 305 billion of saving bonds were 
issued in September 2002 to repay part of the FIDF’s liabilities in the money market.  
By end-2002, THB 805 billion of the FIDF’s losses were already fiscalised (as FIDF I and III) and are 
considered as government debt. The THB 112 billion of government-guaranteed bonds issued in 2000 
were considered as the FIDF’s debt, which was already included in the public debt. Out of the 
remaining THB 472 billion of losses (Table 3), only THB 228 billion (see footnote to Table 1) are 
realised as FIDF liabilities in the balance sheet as non-guaranteed debt, while the rest is expected 
future losses of the FIDF. 
                                                       
4  Established in 1985, the FIDF is a separate legal entity from the BOT. Its roles and responsibilities are, inter alia, to provide 
liquidity support as a last resort to illiquid financial institutions, and to guarantee payment to depositors and creditors. 
5  The Thai Assets Management Corporation, established in 2001, is a legal person with the status of a state agency, rather 
than a state enterprise, under special laws designed to expedite the resolution of the NPL problem of both state-owned and 
private financial institutions and to enable transferred debtors to be in a position to continue their business operations. 
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 Table 3 
Estimated total FIDF losses 
In billions of baht 
1.  Depositor assistance programme   
  56 closed finance companies    519 
 Other  financial  institutions    35 
2.  Loss from shares owned by FIDF   169 
3. NPLs   651 
Total losses from all programmes    1,374 
Add interest  expense   163 
 other  expenses   3 
Less  FIDF premium and others    (139) 
Total losses to be fiscalised    1,401 
Fiscalisation by end-Dec 2002:   
Compensated from FIDF I (THB 500bn of government bonds) in 1998    (513) 
Compensated from FIDF II (THB 112bn of government-guaranteed FIDF bonds) in 2000     (112) 
Compensated from FIDF III/1 (THB 305bn of government saving bonds) in 2002    (305) 
Remaining bonds to be issued    472 
Source: Bank of Thailand. 
 
In summary, in total THB 0.9 trillion of the estimated financial institutions restructuring cost of 
THB  1.4  trillion has already been compensated. For the remainder, more bonds will be issued in 
response to the FIDF’s financing needs and market conditions. Payments of principal on the bonds 
issued for financing the FIDF losses will mostly come from the BOT’s proceeds from operations, while 
the government will meet the interest payments. 
4.  Future fiscal position 
To assess the future fiscal position of the Thai government, its recent initiatives concerning 
government expenditures and revenue are explored. 
Expenditure side 
There are certain government policies that either are perpetual or need future financing, but some are 
not yet recognised as government debt. In Thailand, a number of government initiatives could 
potentially generate additional demands on future budget, or could be possible contingent liabilities. 
These initiatives can be classified into three categories by the source of financing. These include: 
1.  Initiatives to be financed directly from the budget. 
•  The village fund
6 is a revolving fund facility, whereby each village or urban 
community receives a one-time transfer of THB 1 million to finance local investment 
and supplementary occupations. 
                                                       
6  This project was financed by the government guaranteed loan (already included in the public debt figure) from the 
Government Saving Bank, which the government would amortise the amount from the budget within eight years.  
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 •  The universal health insurance scheme aims to extend the provision of low-cost 
health care service to 45 million people (compared with the current 25 million). 
•  The education reform aims to provide free basic education for 12 years (previously 
six), expand compulsory education to nine years (previously six), and improve the 
quality of teaching and the salaries of teaching staff. 
•   Decentralisation involves the transfer of authority and responsibilities from central 
government to local government. This coincides with the Decentralisation Act 1999 
regarding the transfer of revenue to ensure a ratio of local government revenue to 
central government revenue of not less than 20% in 2000/01 and 35% in 2005/06. The 
revenue transferred to local government would be deducted from the gross revenue 
and not be counted as part of the budget. 
2. The  Specialised Financial Institutions (SFI): there are also government initiatives that are 
implemented through SFIs; some items could become contingent liabilities for the 
government, depending on the operations of the SFIs. 
•   People’s Bank was established to improve access to banking facilities and resources 
for the poor. The Government Saving Bank (GSB) implemented this policy by granting 
small loans of THB 15,000 per first-time customer at a flat interest rate of 12%, with 
the repayment period not exceeding one year. The government will not guarantee 
these loans in order to ensure prudent lending practice. 
•   Other lending facilities, such as housing lending by the GSB and loans to SMEs, 
were not guaranteed for the same reason. 
3.  Shared financing: some projects are implemented through SFIs or other government 
agencies, with partial financial support from the government budget, for example: 
•  The  debt burden relief programme comprises two separate projects: debt 
suspension and debt burden reduction. Farmers who joined the debt suspension 
programme are granted a grace period of three years for both principal and interest 
payments. Farmers who joined the debt burden reduction programme still have to 
repay the loans, although with a 3 percentage point reduction in the interest rate for 
three years. The revenue foregone by the GSB through carrying out this programme 
will be compensated from the government budget. 
•  The  housing project for the low-income group was approved by the cabinet with a 
small appropriation from the budget. The government will support low-income 
households by offering up to THB 80,000 per unit per household and seek a low-cost 
financing source for the National Housing Authority (NHA). In building the housing 
units, the NHA will finance the project largely by borrowing from the SFIs with partial 
financial support from the government budget. In addition, the GSB will grant credits to 
people to build or buy a house outside the NHA housing project. Both projects aim to 
construct 1 million residential units within five years. 
•  The oil fund was established as a cushion against the costs of rising domestic fuel 
prices stemming from volatility in the global oil market. The government implemented 
a temporary measure that capped retail petroleum prices for four months from 
February to May 2003. The cost of this scheme was covered by borrowing from the 
GSB, with the interest expense to be paid from the budget and the principal to be 
financed from the fund’s gain from world oil prices being lower than the fixed prices. 
Revenue side 
Although there are many government initiatives that have raised concerns about future spending, the 
improved budgeting methods facilitate implementing fiscal policies without generating fiscal instability. 
While there are risks that government expenditures not fully recognised in the medium-term framework 
could increase, the following fiscal measures and initiatives would improve the fiscal position: 
•   Tax reforms and modernisation. The government is implementing measures to expand the 
tax base and enhance the efficiency of tax collection. In 2001/02, government revenue 
increased considerably as a result of the economic recovery and improved tax 
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 administration, while expenditure decelerated in the second half of the fiscal year. This 
resulted in an actual cash deficit of 2.2% of GDP, lower than the planned 3.2%. 
•   Focus on the strategic plan and strategy. The implementation of a zero-based budgeting 
method accompanied by performance-based budgeting will lead to more efficient allocation 
and effective spending. 
•   The corporatisation of Thailand’s state enterprises. This will increase the efficiency of 
the state enterprises and generate higher profits to shareholders. 
•   Civil service reforms. The policy will help the government to manage personnel expenses. 
Moreover, evaluation based on performance and outcome will help improve the efficiency of 
budget allocation. 
5.  Public debt sustainability 
At the present level of public debt, the fiscal position remains stronger than planned. The government 
has improved fiscal flexibility by improving the efficiency of both revenues and expenditures. The 
government has increased revenue by raising tax collections and expanding the tax base. In 2001/02, 
the tax elasticity to GDP stood at 2.2 compared with 1.5 in 2000/01, reflecting substantially more 
efficient tax collection. The corporatisation of state-owned enterprises will further enhance efficiency 
and bring higher returns to the government. On the expenditure side, the government has improved 
the efficient allocation and effective spending by implementing the zero-based budgeting method 
accompanied with performance-based budgeting. 
The BOT assessed the public debt sustainability from 2002/03 (which extends from October 2002 to 
September 2003) onwards, incorporating the FIDF debt resolution. The general conclusions drawn 
from this exercise indicate that Thai public debt remains sustainable even under relatively dire 
circumstances, some of which are assumed to maintain the VAT rate at the present level of 7%. 
 
Table 4 
Baseline scenario assumptions in the medium term (2002/03-08/09) 
Nominal GDP growth  6.4% 
Implied revenue elasticity  1.10 
Interest rate per annum  6.4% 
Disbursement rate  91% 
Current expenditure growth   
–  Wage and salary expenditure
1  5.0% 
–  Non-interest and non-wage
2  4.8% 
Capital expenditure growth
2  6.4% 
1  Fixed rate.   
2  Depending on GDP growth. 
 
In the projection under the baseline assumptions, shown in Table 5, the public debt already peaked at 
55% of GDP in 2001/02 and is on a declining trend. The large decline in the public debt in 2006/07 
from 2005/06 is attributable to the repayment of the government debt that will become due in 2006/07 
and the improvement in the FIDF debt level due to the FIDF’s expected income in the next four years. 
The cash balance will turn positive in 2006/07. 
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 Table 5 
Projections of important ratios 
In percentages 
 2001/02  2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
Debt service/budget  10.0  12.0 13.2 12.6 12.8 12.7 12.6 13.9 
Public debt/GDP  55.1  53.0  51.2 51.7 50.3 44.2 39.5 35.4 
Budget balance/GDP  –3.7  –3.0  –1.7 –1.1 –0.6 –0.3 0.0 0.0 
Cash balance/GDP  –2.2  –0.5  –0.3 –0.3 –0.1  0.2 0.8 1.2 
Primary Balance/GDP  –0.9  1.0 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.4 
Revenue/GDP 15.9  16.5  16.6  16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.8 
Budget expenditure/GDP  19.2  17.6 17.0 17.5 17.1 16.9 16.7 16.8 
 
Besides the baseline scenario, the stress test analysis (see Annex for details), as shown in Graph 2, 
illustrates the sensitivity of debt dynamics under changes in the macroeconomic scenarios as follows: 
1.  Case A: baseline with the VAT rate adjustment from 7% to 10%. 
2.  Case B: low growth, ie long-run average growth rate (1970-2001) is reduced by one 
standard deviation. 
3.  Case C: higher interest rate from baseline by 3 percentage points. 
4.  Case D: lower NPL recovery rate from baseline by 20 percentage points. 
5.  Case E: worst case scenario, ie cases B to D are combined. 
Graph 2 


















Source: Calculation from stress test analysis in the Annex. 
The scenarios above analyse public debt in the medium term under various macroeconomic 
assumptions and fiscal policy adjustment. Even in the worst case scenario - low growth and high 
interest rate coupled with low NPL recovery rate - the public debt is still moderately sustainable. 
Nevertheless, there remain other factors that could alter the debt path towards a more or less 
sustainable level. 
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 Factors that contribute to debt sustainability include: 
•   high private saving rate 
•   high domestic liquidity and low interest rate environment 
•   moderate public external indebtedness 
•   exchange rate flexibility 
Factors that detract from debt sustainability include: 
•   adverse economic scenarios other than those considered above 
•  contingent  liabilities 
•   near-term gross financing requirement 
•   ongoing fiscal decentralisation process 
Under the fiscal sustainability framework announced by the government, budget balance should be 
achieved within 2006/07. However, in order to ensure sufficient investment spending, the ratio of debt 
service to total budget will be curbed at 16%. The increasing ratio of debt service to the budget is 
attributed to debt repayment. This is supported by evidence that the rise in the budget expenditure in 
2003/04 is partially due to the increase in debt service expenditure, 25% of which will be allocated to 
repayment of principal.
7 
Policy efforts that help contain debt/GDP even when it exceeds the ceiling of 60%: 
•   Introducing structural increases in revenues by expanding the tax base and increasing tax 
collection efficiency. 
•   Raising the NPL recovery rate through effective asset management and imposing a risk 
management framework in public and state-owned enterprises, speeding up the NPL 
resolution process, and strengthening the position of SFIs. 
•   Privatisation to increase profits and realise proceeds from the sale of assets. Note that, 
amongst state enterprises, large debtors tend to have more assets than liabilities, while 
those that are poor performers are small in size and have little debt. 
•   Spending cuts, including fiscal consolidation, three-year budgeting plans, and zero- and 
performance-based budgeting, all of which induce efficient management of government 
spending and eliminate inefficient programmes, together with a VAT increase to 10% when 
necessary. 
•   Ensuring transparency in budgetary operations. 
•   Building institutional capacity for public debt management, including bond market 
development. 
Thai public debt is therefore sustainable in the medium term, even under unfavourable conditions. In 
the context of its target of fiscal sustainability, the government has committed to maintain a debt ratio 
of less than 60% of GDP, achieve budget balance within five years, and steer the debt service ratio to 
lower than 16%. This is achievable if the recent fiscal reform and consolidation continue. 
6.  Conclusion and implications for monetary policy 
The economic and financial crisis in 1997 created a large public debt and has deteriorated the fiscal 
position ever since. The public debt rose rapidly from 14% of GDP in 1996 to 54% in November 2002, 
due to two major policies: financial sector restructuring and expansionary fiscal stances. 
                                                       
7  In Thailand, the principal repayment is included in the budget expenditure. 
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 In addition to the increase caused by the cost of financial institution restructuring, the public debt also 
rose as a result of the expansionary fiscal measures aimed at stimulating the economy. Although there 
are certain government policies that impose a greater financing burden on the government, the outturn 
of the fiscal position in 2001/02, which was better than the planned deficit, reflected the government’s 
goal of fiscal consolidation. Moreover, the positive outcome resulting from the current public sector 
reform may reduce the fiscal burden in the future. 
The medium-term analysis suggests that the public debt is sustainable. However, the government 
could balance the budget within five years and keep the debt/GDP ratio below 60% of GDP if it 
prudently consolidates the budget. This could be achieved by eg (1) spending cuts through fiscal 
consolidation, multi-year budgeting plans, zero- and performance-based budgeting, together with a 
VAT increase to 10% when necessary; (2) the recent structural tax reform continuing to increase the 
tax base; (3) raising the asset recovery rate by speeding up the NPL resolution process and 
strengthening the position of SFIs; (4) privatisation in order to increase profits and realise proceeds 
from the sale of assets; and (5) building institutional capacity for public debt management. 
An analysis of the potential downside risks suggests that even in an adverse scenario the debt 
dynamics would remain manageable and in the government’s debt sustainability framework. These 
risks include: (1) the high sensitivity of debt dynamics to adverse economic conditions; (2) the costs of 
financial sector restructuring; (3) contingent liabilities; (4) the near-term gross financing requirement; 
and (5) the ongoing fiscal decentralisation process. Nevertheless, favourable conditions in the Thai 
economy that should reduce fiscal risks include: (1) the high private saving rate; (2) the high domestic 
liquidity and low interest rate environment; (3)  moderate public external indebtedness; and (4) 
exchange rate flexibility. The worst case scenario (low nominal growth of 2.5%, a high interest rate of 
9.4% and a low asset recovery rate of 15%) drives the debt ratio close to 60%. The government’s 
commitment to fiscal consolidation, accompanied by thorough fiscal reform to increase efficiency in 
budget and debt management, and the acceleration of other tax reforms will lead to fiscal sustainability 
in the near future. 
Monetary and fiscal policy coordination 
The BOT closely coordinates with the government in the management of macroeconomic policy. In 
order to sustain long-term economic growth, the BOT adopted an inflation targeting framework in 
2000, while fiscal policy became more expansionary. While the latter inevitably increased the public 
debt, the fiscal consolidation started in 2002/03 reflected the government’s commitment to bring down 
the level of public debt in the medium term. 
The Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Thailand have agreed to find a solution that is acceptable to 
all parties for dealing with the cost of financial sector restructuring. Any resolution must have a minimal 
impact on the government’s fiscal position, and place a minimal burden on taxpayers in both the short 
and long term. The principal will be funded using the annual net profits from income earned from the 
Bank of Thailand’s currency reserves and operations, rather than through an expansion of the 
monetary base. This guarantees independence of the central bank in its conduct of monetary policy. 
This independence will be further strengthened once the new BOT Act, which stipulates that price 
stability is an overriding objective, comes into effect. 
While the BOT has full independence in setting monetary policy, the fiscal stance is taken into 
consideration in order to bring about an appropriate policy mix that facilitates sustained growth. 
Monetary policy plays an increasing role when fiscal policy is consolidated in order to address the 
problem of public debt in the medium term. The success of economic stabilisation is subject to a well 
defined monetary policy framework, even under the constraint of the high public debt. 
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 Annex: 
Stress test analysis of the  
medium-term public debt projection 
 
Table A1 
Assumptions: Fiscal years 2003/04-08/09 
Case A  Case B  Case C  Case D  Case E 






Cases B to D 
combined 
Real growth  4.8  4.8 2.0  4.8  4.8  2.0 
Inflation 1.6  1.6  0.5 1.6 1.6 0.5 
Interest rate  6.4  6.4 6.4  9.4  6.4  9.4 
(real interest rate)  4.8 4.8  5.9  7.8  4.8  8.9 
(growth – real interest rate) 0.0  0.0  –3.9 –3.0  0.0 –6.9 
VAT (after Oct 2004)  7.0 10.0  7.0  7.0  7.0  7.0 
NPL recovery rate  35.0 35.0  35.0  35.0  15.0  15.0 
 
•   Baseline: The public debt already peaked at 55% of GDP in 2001/02. The large decline in 
the public debt in 2006/07 reflects repayment of government debt due then and the 
improvement of the FIDF debt level due to the FIDF increase expected in the next four 
years. The cash balance will turn positive in 2006/07. 
•   Case A: With an increase in the VAT rate to 10%, and keeping all other variables at their 
baseline values, debt/GDP follows a lower path than baseline and is about 4 percentage 
points lower than baseline at the end of the projection period. The increase in tax revenue 
puts the cash balance and the budget balance in surplus earlier than baseline. 
•   Case B: A one standard deviation reduction in Thailand’s long-run growth rate is consistent 
with a higher real interest rate, due to a lower inflation rate. The rise in the real interest rate 
coupled with the low growth rate causes debt/GDP to decrease to 50% at the end of the 
projection period from 56% at its peak in 2005/06. Primary balance to GDP is at a low of 
0.9%, compared to the baseline of 2.5%. The cash balance and the budget balance remain 
in deficit throughout the projection period. 
•   Case C: The results of an increase in the interest rate by 3 percentage points are not 
significantly different from baseline as an increase in the interest rate will affect only the new 
debt. Debt/GDP is slightly higher at the end of the projection period, with a similar declining 
path. Thus the increase in borrowing costs from higher interest rates does not place too 
great a burden on public debt. 
•   Case D: A lower NPL recovery rate by 20 percentage points increases debt/GDP by 
2 percentage points above baseline at the end of the projection period, although debt/GDP 
still follows a downward trend. Despite the lower NPL recovery rate, the cash balance and 
the budget balance are in surplus in the same period as in the baseline scenario. 
•   Case E: Combining cases B to D as the worst case scenario, debt/GDP reaches a peak of 
59% and declines to 54% at the end of the projection period. Although the debt/GDP path is 
not explosive, it is higher than all the cases considered so far and declines with the rate of 
acceleration less than others. Even under a dire circumstance, the government debt ratio at 
its peak is lower than the government ceiling of 60% as a result of the fast fiscal 
consolidation that will provide the cushion for unfavourable economic condition. 
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Table A2 
Public debt stress test analysis 
In percentages 
BOT  Case A  Case B  Case C  Case D  Case E 










B to D 
combined 
Debt/GDP, September 2009  35.4 31.4 49.5 36.6 37.9 54.0 
Peak debt/GDP  55.1  55.1 55.6 55.9 55.1 59.2 
Change in debt/GDP, 
(2001/02 to 2008/09) 
–19.7 –23.7  –5.6 –18.5 –17.2  –1.1 
Primary balance/GDP 
(average 2002/03-08/09) 
1.7 2.5 0.9 1.7 1.7 0.9 
Budget balance/GDP (year of surplus)  2008  2005  >2009  2008  2008  >2009 
Cash balance/GDP (year of surplus)  2007  2005  >2009  2008  2007  >2009 
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